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PROTECTING THE THRONE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO
PRESERVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN GENTILE V. SEC
INTRODUCTION
Sovereign immunity is a useful tool for governments because it shields
federal bodies from legal claims brought by citizens.1 The Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) serves as a counterweight to sovereign immunity’s
protection by allowing litigants to bring suit against the government under
particular circumstances.2 In a sense, the APA provides litigants, through
the courts, with a tool to check government power.3 “Nevertheless, it can
be challenging for a litigant to successfully leverage the APA waiver of sovereign immunity because there are several laws that serve as exceptions to
the APA and maintain sovereign immunity.”4
In September 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined the competing interests surrounding sovereign immunity in Gentile v. SEC.5 In Gentile, a stockbroker and self-proclaimed “rogue”
government informant, Guy Gentile, tried to utilize the APA’s waiver to
invalidate a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation.6
Gentile’s relationship with the SEC began in 2012, when the SEC investigated him for “penny-stock manipulation.”7 After federal agents arrested
1. See JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 3–4 (2016) (detailing the relevant
questions that surround sovereign immunity in the context of challenges to agency
action). Sovereign immunity is “[a] government’s immunity from being sued in its
own courts without its consent.” Sovereign Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019).
2. See COLE, supra note 1, at 1–2 (describing the history of the APA and its
allowance of judicial review of federal agency action).
3. See id. at 4 (noting that the APA allows “individuals aggrieved by agency
action to bring suit in federal court against the United States and government
employees in their official capacity” since it was amended in 1976).
4. See id. at 11 (“Judicial review of agency action under the APA is unavailable
in two important situations: (1) when a statute precludes review and (2) when the
agency’s action is legally committed to an agency’s discretion.”). For more detail
on sovereign immunity, see infra notes 24–34 and accompanying text.
5. 974 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020).
6. See Zeke Faux, ‘Bro, I’m Going Rogue’: The Wall Street Informant Who DoubleCrossed the FBI, BLOOMBERG (March 23, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2017-03-23/-bro-i-m-going-rogue-the-wall-street-informant-who-doublecrossed-the-fbi [https://perma.cc/2EGW-CEQS].
7. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 313 (“Guy Gentile and the Securities and Exchange
Commission are not strangers. Their acquaintance dates back to 2012 when the
SEC investigated Gentile for his role in penny-stock manipulation scheme in 200708.”); see also SEC v. Gentile, 16-1619, 2017 WL 6371301, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13,
2017) (alleging Gentile’s involvement in penny-stock manipulation in 2007). See
generally David S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission,
Penny Stock Manipulation and the Small Investor, Remarks Before the Twenty-
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Gentile, he struck a deal with the government and agreed to become an
FBI informant.8 From 2012 to 2016, Gentile helped the FBI gather evidence on brokers suspected of securities fraud, often by participating in
sham meetings where Gentile would surreptitiously record brokers pitching their schemes.9
In 2016, Gentile’s relationship with the government soured after he
learned that he would still be charged for his “pump-and-dump schemes
. . . from 2007 to 2008.”10 Gentile refused to continue his cooperation and
was subsequently indicted in March of 2016.11 Simultaneously, the SEC
brought a civil enforcement action against Gentile in the District Court for
the District of New Jersey seeking disgorgement of profits and an injunction that would prohibit him from trading penny stocks.12
While the SEC was pursuing a civil suit against Gentile in New Jersey,
the SEC’s regional office in Miami was conducting an ongoing investigation into Traders Café, LLC, a trading platform that Gentile was involved
with through his own brokerage, SureTrader.13 Traders Café was run by
two unregistered broker-dealers who used the platform as a vehicle for
fraudulent day trading schemes.14 In 2013, during the course of the Traders Café investigation, the SEC issued a Formal Order of Investigation
First Annual Rocky-Mountain-State-Federal-Provincial Securities Conference 2
(Oct. 21, 1988) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1988/
102188ruder.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCK5-YC74]) (“Penny stocks are low-priced
securities traded over-the-counter. They are usually traded outside of the National
Association of Securities Dealers’ Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) and
are usually quoted in the National Quotation Bureau’s ‘pink sheets.’ ”). “[P]enny
stocks will be sold to the public at ever increasing prices, so that the promoters will
profit by selling at grossly inflated values and the broker-dealers will profit by huge
markups and commissions.” Id. at 7.
8. See SEC v. Gentile, 939 F.3d 549, 552 (3d. Cir 2018).
9. See Faux, supra note 6.
10. Gentile, 939 F.3d at 552; see also Faux, supra note 6 (“That June, his worst
fear came true: Prosecutors told him he’d have to plead guilty to a felony stemming from the original charges against him. They said he wouldn’t serve any time
in prison, but Gentile nevertheless felt betrayed.”).
11. See United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649, 651 (D.N.J. 2017) (“The
plea agreement that was presented to Defendant, if followed by the Court, would
have resulted in a sentence of probation. Defendant rejected the plea off[er] and
was subsequent[ly] indicted on March 23, 2016.” (citation omitted)).
12. See Gentile, 939 F.3d at 552 (describing the relief sought by the SEC).
13. See Gentile v. SEC, No. 19-5155, 2019 WL 2098832, at *1 (D.N.J. May 5,
2019) (“Since around August of 2015, Plaintiff has been aware of an SEC investigation out of the Miami Regional Office into whether Plaintiff and his Bahamasbased broker-dealer, SureTrader, improperly solicited United States customers.”).
14. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Unregistered
Broker in Tampa Area With Stealing From Investors in Fraudulent Day Trading
Scheme (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-259
[https://perma.cc/CTS2-XVWB] (reporting that the two unregistered brokerdealers associated with Traders Café violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 and Section 15(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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(“FOI”).15 The FOI authorized the SEC to investigate any individuals related to Traders Café.16 Despite the SEC charging the prime suspect in
the Traders Café investigation, Albert J. Scipione, in 2014, and the New
Jersey court’s dismissal of the SEC’s enforcement action, the SEC continued to use the Traders Café FOI as a tool to investigate Gentile and
SureTrader.17
Traders Café had an account with Gentile’s SureTrader, creating the
nexus that the SEC needed to use the Traders Café FOI to investigate
Gentile.18 While investigating Gentile and SureTrader, the SEC issued numerous administrative subpoenas to individuals and entities associated
with Gentile and SureTrader.19 Gentile believed the SEC was targeting
him after the federal district court in New Jersey dismissed the SEC’s civil
suit against him for a failure to satisfy the statute of limitations.20
As a result of the SEC’s administrative subpoenas, Gentile claimed
that his business interests had unfairly suffered due to illegal SEC activity.21 Gentile sought a preliminary injunction against the SEC in District
Court.22 Gentile’s case made its way to the Third Circuit, where the court
ruled in favor of the SEC by holding that Gentile’s claim was barred by
sovereign immunity.23
15. See Gentile, 2019 WL 2098832, at *2 (“According to Plaintiff, the Florida
SEC investigation relies on a formal order of investigation . . . dated November 5,
2013 entitled ‘In the matter of Traders Café, LLC,’ which authorizes an investigation into individuals related to an entity called Traders Café.”).
16. See id.
17. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 314 (“The SEC issued a Formal Order of Investigation into Traders Café on November 25, 2013. But later, without issuing a new
Formal Order of Investigation, the SEC informed Gentile that he was a target in
that investigation.”); see also Litigation Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Litigation Release No. 23136 (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr23136.htm [https://perma.cc/7MT6-PMB3] (reporting that
Albert J. Scipione pleaded guilty to criminal charges involving Traders Café).
18. See Gentile, 2019 WL 2098832, at *2 (“Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that there is
no connection whatsoever between Traders Café and Plaintiff’s Bahamian brokerdealer, other than the fact that Traders Café maintains or maintained an account
at Plaintiff’s broker-dealer.”).
19. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 314 (“Instead, the SEC has pursued other options
for obtaining information, and it has not been shy about serving subpoenas on
other entities associated with Gentile.”).
20. See Gentile, 2019 WL 2098832, at *2 (claiming the SEC Miami Regional
Office “lack[ed] the necessary authority to proceed with or to enforce existing
subpoenas absent a proper FOI”).
21. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 314 n.2 (citing Gentile’s complaint where he
claimed that banks and vendors had stopped doing business with him and his business entities).
22. See Gentile, 2019 WL 2098832, at *1 (stating that Gentile sought a preliminary injunction and the SEC moved to dismiss).
23. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 320 (“Gentile’s complaint had to be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we will affirm the judgment of the district
court.”). For more information on sovereign immunity and subject matter jurisdiction, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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This Casebrief argues that although the Third Circuit’s decision in
Gentile was a product of sound legal reasoning, the opinion exposed the
limitations of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Part I of this
Casebrief analyzes the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the structure of
the APA’s waiver. Part II discusses the Third Circuit’s reasoning and holding in Gentile. Part III sheds light on the problems inherent in the structure of the APA’s waiver and the potential for abuse that may result from
these defects. Finally, Part IV explores the impact that the Third Circuit’s
decision may have on future litigants challenging federal agency action.
I. BACKGROUND
Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that prevents a plaintiff from
suing the government without the government’s consent.24 Although
there are no “sovereigns” in the United States, American courts and government lawyers invoke the principle as a standard legal rule.25 There are
several competing theories that seek to explain this protection.26 Commentators have questioned the applicability of the doctrine in the American context and some, if not most, believe that sovereign immunity has no
place in the American legal landscape.27
24. See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2017) (“Read for all it is worth, [sovereign immunity] might be a bar to
nearly all affirmative judicial relief against government action.”); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201–02 (2001)
(noting that the sovereign immunity doctrine has roots in English law where it was
intended to protect the king from legal claims).
25. See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1202; see also Gentile, 974 F.3d 311 at
313 (dismissing Gentile’s claim due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Attorneys representing the federal government can invoke sovereign immunity as a bar
to subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 315 (laying out the SEC’s argument for
dismissal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Additionally, a court must
throw out a claim it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over, regardless of
whether the problem is raised by either party or whether either party is willing to
waive the issue. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV.
1829, 1831 (2007) (noting that subject matter jurisdiction requirements may not
be waived by parties to a suit).
26. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1529, 1530 (1992) (arguing the doctrine of sovereign immunity is built on the
“desire to maintain” the separation of powers in government). The doctrine of
sovereign immunity serves “a structural protection for democratic rule.” Id. at
1531; see also Corey Brettschneider & David McNamee, Sovereign and State: A Democratic Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1229, 1241–52 (2015) (critiquing
popular theories of sovereign immunity, including those based on constitutional
interpretation and on the idea of the “inherent dignity” of a state); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 523 (2003) (noting the doctrine’s “meaning is contested and contestable”).
27. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1201 (“Sovereign immunity is an
anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be eliminated from American
law.”); Jackson, supra note 26, at 609 (noting that the doctrine’s “constitutional
provenance is at best unclear”); Krent, supra note 26, at 1530 (stating that the
doctrine “persists subject to near unanimous condemnation from commentators”).
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Sovereign immunity serves as a useful tool for the federal government.28 The doctrine offers broad protection to the government, which
the court in Gentile made clear when it pointed out that “sovereign immunity shields federal agencies from suit.”29 Given the large number of federal agencies, from the Postal Service to the Department of Justice, and
the amount of work that these various bodies undertake, sovereign immunity insulates a large amount of federal activity from legal challenge.30
Although sovereign immunity provides far ranging protection for the
government, Congress has limited the application of the doctrine.31 As
previously noted, sovereign immunity’s protection is available only if the
government does not consent to suit.32 The most well-known method by
which the government establishes its consent to suit is through a waiver of
sovereign immunity.33 There are many statutes that waive sovereign immunity, including the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Tucker Act, and of
course, the APA.34
Congress enacted the APA in 1946 on the heels of creating and expanding many federal agencies throughout the New Deal era.35 Congress
created the APA as an attempt to codify rules for regulating the growing
reserve of federal agency power.36 In fact, the Chair of the Senate Judici28. See Krent, supra note 26, at 1530 (“[U]nlike private individuals and entities, the government is liable only to the extent it deems appropriate.”). Krent
argues that the doctrine places the government in a preferred position over other
potential defendants. Id.; see also Gentile, 974 F.3d at 320 (dismissing Gentile’s
claim against the SEC based on sovereign immunity).
29. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 313.
30. See Krent, supra note 26, at 1542.
31. See id. at 1543 (discussing the power of Congress to waive sovereign immunity for various types of claims against federal agencies). Krent analyzes the structural and political considerations that Congress makes when deciding when and
how to waive sovereign immunity for agencies. Id. at 1542 (noting that political
controls are less effective when applied to agency rather than legislative action and
that this structural issue calls for less robust protection for agency action).
32. See Sovereign Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
33. See Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58
OKLA. L. REV. 439, 458–59 (2005) (noting that “Congress has gradually lowered
the shield of sovereign immunity” through the use of statutory waivers). Sisk outlines the evolution of Congressional waivers and concludes that these statutory
provisions have become the focus of challenges to government activity. Id. at 460
(noting the shift from common law arguments to claims based directly on Congressional waivers).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2021) (Federal Tort Claims Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(2021) (Tucker Act); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2020) (APA); see also Sisk, supra note 33, at
458–59 n.118 (describing these and other statutes limiting sovereign immunity).
35. Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 208–09 (2015) (describing how the growth of the
administrative state prompted discussions about control over these bodies). Political motivations on both sides of the aisle prompted the APA’s passage. See id. at
211–14.
36. See id. at 208–09 (discussing the desire to increase control over federal
agencies). Prior to the APA, and despite the constantly increasing reserve of administrative power, “there were . . . no comprehensive standards for governing
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ary Committee in 1946 referred to the law as “a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated
in one way or another by agencies of the Federal Government. It is designed to provide guarantees of due process in administrative
procedure.”37
At first glance, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity appears
broad.38 In its original form, the waiver had a statutory standing requirement that forced plaintiffs to have experienced either a legal wrong or an
adverse effect due to agency action.39 A 1976 amendment to the waiver
“explicitly waived sovereign immunity to sue the United States for ‘relief
other than monetary damages[,]’” providing a clear right of action against
agencies.40 As explained by the Third Circuit, an explicit Congressional
waiver must exist in order for challenges to agency action to proceed.41
Although the APA granted citizens the right to sue the federal government, Congress placed four relevant limitations on this ability.42 The
1976 amendment included two provisos: one requiring that any application of the APA’s waiver complies with “other limitations on judicial review[,]” and one barring claims if another statute granting consent to suit
prevents the specific relief sought.43 As a result, if either of these provisos
are met, sovereign immunity bars legal relief. According to the Third Ciragency action.” Id. at 209.; see also COLE, supra note 1, at 1 (“[T]he Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) [is] perhaps the most prominent modern vehicle for challenging the actions of a federal agency.”).
37. David H. Rosenbloom, 1946: Framing a Lasting Congressional Response to the
Administrative State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 179 (1998) (quoting 92 CONG. REC.
2149 (1946) (reporting remarks by Senator Pat McCarran, a Democrat from
Nevada).
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2020). The waiver’s first sentence provides that “[a]
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof.” Id.; see also Gentile v. SEC, 974 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir.
2020) (referencing the waiver’s scope).
39. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 316.
40. Id. (explaining the development of the APA’s waiver); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (“The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a
judgement or decree may be entered against the United States . . . .”).
41. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 315–16 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749
(1999)) (stating that courts will look for “an unequivocal statutory waiver” of sovereign immunity before entertaining a claim against the government); COLE, supra
note 1, at 4 (noting that courts will not imply a waiver).
42. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–702 (2021) (outlining the waiver’s limitations); Gentile, 974 F.3d at 316–17. The Third Circuit described the limits included in section
701 as “exceptions” to the waiver and the limits included in section 702 as
“provisos.” Id.
43. See § 702; Gentile, 974 F.3d at 316 (describing the provisos added to the
waiver by the 1976 amendment); COLE, supra note 1, at 4 n.38 (discussing the
amendment’s impact). In this Casebrief, “judicial review” refers to courts analyzing and evaluating government action for compliance with statutory standards
rather than the traditional meaning of evaluating legislation for compliance with
the Constitution. See generally Jackson, supra note 26, at 568–69 (discussing judicial
review under the APA).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss4/4

6

Brady and Reid: Protecting the Throne: The Third Circuit's Decision to Preserve S

2021]

CASEBRIEF

789

cuit, these provisos were needed to prevent the waiver from “overtak[ing]
pre-existing limitations on judicial review . . . .”44
Two additional exceptions further restrict the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.45 The first exception requires that no other statute “preclude judicial review[.]”46 The second exception prohibits judicial review
of “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law.”47
Thus, despite the APA’s “broad waiver[,]” there are four explicit limitations placed on a federal court’s ability to entertain claims against federal
agencies.48
The waiver’s provisos and exceptions are precise, requiring careful
analysis of both statutory language and the challenged agency activity.49
The APA’s waiver requires that a plaintiff challenge “agency action[.]”50
When a party contests SEC activity, the claim may implicate the waiver’s
first proviso, which triggers a provision in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 that arguably prevents challenges to SEC subpoenas.51 This statutory
provision sets forth “that subpoena enforcement actions under the Exchange Act, ‘are the exclusive method by which the validity of SEC investigations and subpoenas may be tested in federal courts.’”52
Although all four of these limitations may be used to negate the
waiver, the carve out for “agency discretion” seems to require particularly
careful judicial analysis.53 Unlike “agency action,” which has a statutory
definition, “agency discretion” has been largely defined by Supreme Court
precedent .54 The Supreme Court has ruled that judicial review is not
available when “a court would have no meaningful standard against which
to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”55 While some types of
agency action have been classified as falling within the realm of agency
44. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 316 (discussing the interplay between the amendment’s unequivocal waiver and provisos).
45. See §§ 701(a)(1)–(2) (setting forth exceptions to the applicability of the
APA’s waiver); Gentile, 974 F.3d at 316–17.
46. § 701(a)(1).
47. Id. § 702(a)(2).
48. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 316.
49. See infra notes 67–76 for a description of how the Third Circuit approached this analysis in Gentile.
50. Agency action is defined as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof or failure to act[.]” 5
U.S.C. § 551(13) (2021).
51. See 15 U.S.C § 78u(c) (2020) (providing a method by which the SEC may
seek judicial assistance to enforce subpoenas).
52. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 318 (quoting Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968, 975
(2d Cir. 1983)). This provision arguably gives the SEC unilateral power to have
subpoenas reviewed by courts. See id.
53. See infra notes 72–76 for a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of the
agency discretion question.
54. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 318–19 (reviewing Supreme Court precedent discussing the limits on judicial review attributable to agency discretion); 5 U.S.C. §
551(13).
55. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
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discretion, sovereign immunity is extended to all decisions that “involve ‘a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within
[the agency’s] expertise.’”56
II. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In 2019, Gentile sued the SEC, seeking a preliminary injunction for
the SEC’s ongoing investigation into himself and SureTrader, Gentile’s
Brokerage.57 Gentile argued that it was improper for the SEC to investigate himself and SureTrader based on the Trader’s Café FOI.58 Gentile
alleged that the SEC was using the Traders Café investigation to gather
additional information to strengthen its civil suit against Gentile in New
Jersey.59
The district court ruled in favor of the SEC, granting its motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.60 On appeal, the Third Circuit ultimately found that Gentile’s claim fell outside of the APA’s waiver
of sovereign immunity.61 While the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the district court, the two courts used different reasoning to reach their
conclusions.62 The district court used the Sprecher v. Graber method to determine that sovereign immunity barred Gentile’s complaint by triggering
one of the waiver’s provisos.63 Relying on Sprecher, the district court noted
that statutory language “makes explicit that the APA’s waiver does not af56. Id. at 831.
57. See supra notes 13 and 21–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the SEC’s investigation into SureTrader.
58. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 317–18 (“Gentile argues that the Formal Order of Investigation exceeds the SEC’s authority because it does not have a sufficient nexus
to his conduct and because it allows a retributive investigation.”).
59. Gentile v. SEC, No. 19-5155, 2019 WL 2098832, at *1 (D.N.J. May 5, 2019)
(“Plaintiff alleges that the SEC is using the Florida investigation as a pretext to
gather additional information to further its case in New Jersey and to overcome
the statute of limitations.”).
60. Id. at *9.
61. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 319 (dismissing Gentile’s complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and affirming the judgment of the district court).
62. See id. at 313–19; Gentile, 2019 WL 2098832, at *1–6.
63. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 315 (citing Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968 (2d
Cir. 1983)). In Sprecher, the plaintiff sought to enjoin an SEC investigation claiming that he was being harassed. Sprecher, 716 F.2d at 971. The court found that the
APA was the only statute that could possibly enable the plaintiff to challenge the
SEC’s sovereign immunity. Id. at 973. However, the court found that the plaintiff’s complaint triggered a proviso of Section 702 of the APA. Id. Specifically, the
complaint fell under the proviso stating that the APA does not limit other avenues
for judicial review. See id. at 974. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim
triggered the proviso because Section 78u(c) of the Exchange Act limited judicial
review. Id. “Section 78u(c) is the exclusive method by which the validity of SEC
investigations and subpoenas may be tested in the federal courts.” Id. at 975. The
court noted that Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity where another statute provided a form of relief. Id. at 973. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims
were barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 971.
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fect other limitations on judicial review.”64 The district court reasoned
that section 78u(c) of the Securities Exchange Act provided the exclusive
mechanism for disputing SEC-issued subpoenas.65 “Thus, due to the proviso, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity could not expand the Exchange Act’s limitation on judicial review—leaving Gentile’s complaint
barred by sovereign immunity.”66
However, the Third Circuit found that the Sprecher analysis was improper.67 The court, in contrast to the district court, reasoned that section
78u(c) of the Securities Exchange Act did not apply because Gentile had
not challenged individual subpoenas, but the FOI itself.68 Gentile broadly
argued that the SEC did not have authority to initially open the investigation.69 Gentile contended that the SEC lacked a sufficient nexus to link
his conduct to Traders Café, thus nullifying the validity of the subpoenas
stemming from the Traders Café FOI.70 Therefore, the Third Circuit
found the district court’s use of the Sprecher analysis to be misplaced.71
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit agreed with the SEC’s argument that
“due to the exception for ‘agency action committed to agency discretion
by law,’ sovereign immunity prevents judicial review of its Formal Order of
Investigation.”72 The court recognized the long history of jurisprudence
upholding agency discretion as nonreviewable, citing Supreme Court decisions that protected agency discretion not to investigate or prosecute.73
Importantly, the Third Circuit equated the considerations that dictate
agency decisions not to investigate with considerations that dictate agency
decisions to investigate.74 Thus, the court held, “because an agency deci64. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 315 (recounting the Second Circuit’s decision in
Sprecher and the District Court of New Jersey’s application of the Sprecher holding);
see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2021).
65. Gentile, 2019 WL 2098832, at *4 (“Section 78u(c) is the exclusive method
by which the validity of SEC investigations and subpoenas may be tested in federal
courts.” (quoting Sprecher, 716 F.3d at 975)).
66. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 315 (noting that the district court did not address the
SEC’s argument that agency action is protected by the use of agency discretion).
67. Id. at 318 (“And by directing his challenge to the SEC’s Formal Order of
Investigation, Gentile avoids the SEC’s Sprecher argument, which involved a challenge to individual subpoenas—not solely a direct challenge to the agency’s decision to open an investigation.”).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 317–18 (“Gentile argues that the Formal Order of Investigation
exceeds the SEC’s authority because it does not have a sufficient nexus to his conduct and because it allows a retributive investigation.”).
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)) (finding that the
SEC’s use of discretion meant that the APA’s waiver was inapplicable).
73. Id. at 318–19 (first citing ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270
(1987); then citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); then citing Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)).
74. Id. at 319 (“[T]he same set of considerations governs both decisions to
investigate and decisions not to investigate.”).
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sion to investigate fits within the section 701(a) exception, targeted piecemeal challenges to that action fall outside of the APA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity.”75 Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that sovereign immunity
barred Gentile’s complaint and subsequently dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, affirming the district court’s holding.76
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Whether legal scholars deem sovereign immunity an appropriate bar
to a legal claim against the government depends on the theory applied.77
As applied to Gentile, a broad interpretation of the sovereign immunity
doctrine would suggest the SEC’s investigation into Gentile is uncontestable because the SEC, as a federal agency, requires freedom to perform its
Congressional mandates.78 A narrower view of sovereign immunity would
suggest that the SEC’s activity should be reviewed in light of the direct
negative effects that the agency’s investigation had on Gentile and his business interests.79 Regardless of the theory applied, the Third Circuit’s decision shows that the current construction of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, as applied to the activity of federal agencies, permits few claims
against the government.80
The Third Circuit’s decision is not judicial overreach; the court dutifully followed the APA’s provisos and exceptions and closely adhered to
Supreme Court precedent.81 Despite the general display of judicial re75. Id. at 320 (noting the SEC’s power to investigate contains a power to defame and destroy).
76. Id.
77. For a discussion of some of the competing theoretical underpinnings for
sovereign immunity, see supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. Some commentators who have a particular concern over the possibility of judicial review violating separation of powers principles may see the doctrine as properly applicable
in the United States. See Krent, supra note 26, at 1530. Other commentators who
denounce sovereign immunity’s applicability in the American context are likely to
think that the doctrine is never appropriate to insulate the government from suit.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1201.
78. See Krent, supra note 26, at 1542 (discussing Congressional delegations of
power to federal agencies in the context of sovereign immunity). Although Krent
notes that judicial review of agency activity is more appropriate than judicial review
of Congressional action, he recognizes that preventing overzealous judicial review
of agency policymaking is an important protection afforded by sovereign immunity. See id.
79. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 314 n.2 (outlining the financial injuries that Gentile claimed to have suffered because of the SEC’s investigation). Supporters of
this interpretation would likely point to Senator McCarran’s description of the
APA as “a bill of rights” to ensure that citizens’ interests would be protected from
overreaching by federal agencies. For an overview of Senator McCarran’s remarks,
see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text for an analysis of sovereign
immunity’s relationship with agency action and discretion.
81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third
Circuit’s decision-making process and adherence to statutory and judicial
precedent.
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straint, the court’s ruling to equate agency decisions to investigate with
agency decisions not to investigate was a choice that was not explicitly supported by either statute or judicial precedent.82
This decision further insulates federal agencies from suit and
strengthens the leeway that agencies enjoy when it comes to the APA
waiver’s discretion requirement.83 Discretion, described by the Third Circuit as a balancing of various factors for which there is “no meaningful
standard” by which to evaluate agency activity, is a relatively vague term
that agencies can point to in order to secure the protections afforded by
sovereign immunity.84 Maintaining a zone in which agencies can freely
operate to satisfy their mandates is important, but insulating them from
suit based on “discretion,” particularly when that term is vaguely defined,
provides a wide berth for agencies that can lead to agency overreach.85
Gentile’s main complaint in suing the SEC was that the agency was
harassing his business and business associates.86 Interestingly, the Third
Circuit indicated its agreement with Gentile noting that the SEC had
other means at its disposal to gather information on Gentile.87 Discussing
the subpoenas issued to Gentile stemming from the Traders Café, LLC
investigation, the Third Circuit stated that “[Gentile] refused to comply
with those subpoenas, and despite having the ability under the Exchange
Act to initiate an action to enforce those subpoenas, the SEC has not done
so.”88 The Third Circuit pointed out that instead of utilizing the sub82. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 319–20 (discussing the similarity between decisions
to investigate and decisions to refrain from investigation). The paragraph in
which the court concludes that decisions to investigate are not susceptible to challenge is one of the few in its opinion that does not reference Supreme Court precedent. See id.
83. See Krent, supra note 26, at 1542 (stating that “the constraints on agency
action cannot be trusted fully . . .”); see also Gentile, 974 F.3d at 319 (noting that the
traditional decisions that have been deemed to be products of agency discretion
are decisions not to investigate, decisions involving national security concerns, and
decisions regarding lump sum spending). The decision to institute an investigation does not appear in this list of “traditional” examples. Id.
84. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 318–19 (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191
(1993)) (noting that the factors considered are often “peculiarly within the
agency’s expertise”). Although the court notes that the discretion exception applies in “rare circumstances,” its holding nonetheless expands the scope of the
protection offered by the APA and provides agencies with another type of action to
compare future activity with when hoping to seek protection under the discretion
umbrella. See id. at 318 (quoting Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 19).
85. See Krent, supra note 26, at 1542 (“Because the constraints on agency action cannot be trusted fully, Congress has subjected much agency policymaking to
judicial review . . . .”).
86. See Gentile v. SEC, No. 19-5155, 2019 WL 2098832, at *5 (D.N.J. May 5,
2019) (“Plaintiff argues that the ongoing Florida investigation is intended only to
harass him, to blacklist him in his business community, and to circumvent this
Court’s 2017 dismissal of the SEC’s claims of penny stock manipulation.”).
87. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 314 (noting that the SEC did not enforce the original
subpoenas and was not shy about issuing subpoenas to Gentile‘s associates).
88. Id. at 314 (citation omitted).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2021], Art. 4

794

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: p. 783

poena enforcement provision contained in the Exchange Act, the SEC issued numerous subpoenas to Gentile’s business associates.89
The SEC’s decision to issue new subpoenas rather than enforce Gentile’s original subpoenas might lend support to Gentile’s complaint that
the SEC was intentionally trying to negatively affect his business interests.90 In fact, the Third Circuit’s opinion included the SEC’s recognition
that the agency’s power, if wielded unjustly, has the potential to destroy
businesses and lives.91 This supports an argument that the SEC went out
of its way to maximize disruption to Gentile’s business interests and personal life.92 The very investigative abuse the Third Circuit warned against
might have been on display in Gentile.93
Similarly, the Third Circuit’s description of the interplay between the
APA waiver’s provisos and exceptions shows that Gentile may have had no
way of getting around the sovereign immunity barrier.94 Gentile had two
options in structuring his complaint. First, Gentile could have attacked
the validity of individual subpoenas.95 As the district court found, however, the Exchange Act provides the exclusive method for challenging an
SEC subpoena.96 Any complaint challenging an individual subpoena
would have been analyzed under the Sprecher test and likely would have
been dismissed.97 Second, Gentile could have pleaded as he did, challenging the validity of the SEC’s entire investigation.98 However, the
Third Circuit made clear that a challenge to an FOI is barred by the ex89. See id. (stating that the SEC served Gentile’s personal attorney and an entity affiliated with Gentile’s Bahamian broker-dealer with subpoenas instead of relying on the Exchange Act’s provision); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (2020).
90. See Gentile, 2019 WL 2098832, at *2 (“Plaintiff claims that the [Litigation
Release] ‘was intended to tar [Plaintiff] as a wrongdoer’ and to ‘inflict maximum
harm to [Plaintiff] before this Court has an opportunity to rule on his cause of
action.” (alteration in original)).
91. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 320 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 200.66, which explicitly recognizes the potential harm that SEC investigations may cause to those being
investigated).
92. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
93. See id.
94. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 319 (“Gentile attempts to avoid [triggering the proviso] by limiting his challenges to two components of the SEC’s investigation: its
nexus to him and its allegedly retributive motive.”)
95. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
96. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 315 (describing the district court’s Sprecher analysis
which found that the Exchange Act provides the exclusive mechanism for disputing SEC-issued investigative subpoenas); see also Gentile v. SEC, No. 19-5155, 2019
WL 2098832, at *4–6. (D.N.J. May 5, 2019).
97. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 318 (“And by directing his challenge to the SEC’s
Formal Order of Investigation, Gentile avoids the SEC’s Sprecher argument, which
involved a challenge to individual subpoenas—not solely a direct challenge to the
agency’s decision to open an investigation.”); 5 U.S.C § 702 (stating that the APA’s
waiver does not affect “other limitations on judicial review”); see also Gentile, 2019
WL 2098832, at *6 (holding that Gentile’s complaint was dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under a Sprecher analysis).
98. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss4/4

12

Brady and Reid: Protecting the Throne: The Third Circuit's Decision to Preserve S

2021]

CASEBRIEF

795

ception protecting agency discretion.99 Therefore, regardless of Gentile’s
pleading strategy, he would have triggered an APA exception and been
barred by sovereign immunity.100
Given the deterioration of his prior relationship with the federal government, Gentile rationally feared harassment from the SEC during the
early stages of the investigation.101 Regardless of whether this fear was
substantiated, however, Gentile’s desire to be free from unwarranted government harassment can certainly be appreciated.102 While there is a
need to balance allowing agencies to operate and affording citizens a zone
of autonomy, the exceptions that have been carved out of the APA’s waiver
appear to tilt this scale in favor of agency freedom.
At the end of its opinion, the Third Circuit goes out of its way to
remind readers that “the power to investigate carries with it the power to
defame and destroy[.]”103 The recognition of this power shows that more
robust limitations on the sovereign immunity doctrine may be necessary in
order to protect citizens from agency overreach and satisfy the original
hopes of the APA’s framers. Specifically, Gentile’s inability to bypass sovereign immunity regardless of his pleading route highlights the underinclusive nature of the APA.104 Ultimately, the Third Circuit’s decision
reaffirmed sovereign immunity as a powerful insulator for federal agencies
and displayed how the APA can leave litigants in a no-win situation.
CONCLUSION
The story of Guy Gentile, his relationship with the SEC, and his eventual legal battle with the same agency offers a powerful case study of the
sovereign immunity doctrine. If you ask Gentile, he has been the target of
99. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 320. (“[B]ecause an agency decision to investigate
fits within the §701(a)(2) exception, targeted piecemeal challenges to that action
fall outside of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.”).
100. See id. (“A litigant cannot, therefore, avoid the exception by challenging
only the most problematic component of an agency action that is committed to
agency discretion by law.”).
101. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gentile’s
work for the federal government and the subsequent falling out between the
parties.
102. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
political motivation to curtail this very type of government overreach, which led
Congress to enact the APA.
103. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 320 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 200.66) (pointing to a federal regulation in which the SEC recognizes the potential effects of its investigative
power).
104. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Revealing Redundancy: The Tension Between Federal
Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 77, 84–85 (2005)
(“The APA, for its part, has some well-known limitations. It does not authorize
suits against the President, suits challenging actions that are committed to agency
discretion, or suits seeking relief that is expressly or impliedly precluded by another statute.” (footnotes omitted)).
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SEC badgering and harassment and deserves to be left alone.105 If you ask
the SEC, the agency is just doing its job, which it cannot do effectively if it
is constantly being hauled to court to explain itself to the judiciary.106
The Third Circuit’s decision in Gentile, with its detailed explanation of
proper pleading standards and contestable agency action, should make it
easier for plaintiffs to understand the APA’s waiver and its limitations.107
The court dismissed Gentile’s claim because it found that the government
did not waive sovereign immunity under the APA.108 For a plaintiff looking to avoid the same fate as Gentile, this case serves as an instruction
manual on how to identify agency action that is susceptible to challenge.
For starters, plaintiffs must challenge specific agency action.109 As
the Third Circuit explained, a broad attack on an agency’s general authority is not sufficient.110 Gentile’s failure to contest specific SEC actions,
such as certain subpoenas or other concrete investigatory steps or documents, other than the FOI, sunk his case before it even began.111

105. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 313–15. According to the complaint filed by Gentile, his business activity was severely hampered as a result of the SEC’s investigation. Id. at 314 n.2. The court noted that the SEC pursued “other options” for
obtaining subpoenas rather than using established statutory procedures. Id. at
314.
106. See id. at 317 (discussing the impropriety of challenging the general administration of agency programs); see also Krent, supra note 26, at 1530 (arguing
that sovereign immunity is intended to “maintain a proper balance among the
branches of the federal government . . . .”). Krent recognizes the potential chilling
effect that judicial preferences may have on legislative or agency action. See id.
107. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 316 (stating that a plaintiff must have statutory
standing, seek non-monetary relief, and have a claim that is not barred by either of
the statute’s provisos). The court also discussed the two exceptions to otherwise
non-barred claims. Id. at 316–17. The opinion provided future claimants with a
practical examination of these statutory requirements and how they interact with
one another. See id.
108. Id. at 320 (dismissing Gentile’s claim for a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
109. See id. at 317–18. As the court noted, Section 551(13) defines agency
action and provides examples of the same. See id. at 317. Although the actions
listed in Section 551(13) are “exemplary, not exhaustive,” they provide a good
indication of the types of activity that are contestable. Id.; see also COLE, supra note
1, at 10 (noting that the statutory definition of agency action “is not
comprehensive”).
110. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 317 (noting that “broad challenges to the administration of an entire program” are insufficient for a claim to fall within the APA’s
waiver).
111. See id. at 317–18. The Third Circuit described Gentile’s approach as an
attempt “to undermine the SEC’s authority.” Id. at 318. The court drew a distinction, as required by the APA, between agency activity and an agency’s power, with
the former being subject to challenge. See id.; see also COLE, supra note 1 at 10
(providing examples of specific agency action that is reviewable under the APA’s
waiver).
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The court also made clear that plaintiffs must avoid challenges to
agency action that is the product of “agency discretion.”112 The court explained that any agency decision that requires the agency to balance various factors will likely be insulated from challenge.113 As a result of the
structure of the relevant statutes and a court’s faithful interpretation of
those laws, most, if not all, agency decisions to investigate are likely to be
insulated from judicial review.
Future plaintiffs who look to Gentile for guidance will find that the
potential avenues for challenging agency activity are narrow. When
pieced together, the court’s decision explains that plaintiffs, in addition to
a host of other requirements, must target specific agency action that is not
a product of agency discretion.114 The Third Circuit’s decision was not
unprecedented in creating this limited path to relief, but relied on prior
statutory and judicial construction of the sovereign immunity doctrine and
of the APA’s waiver.115 Plaintiffs hoping to challenge agency action are
unlikely to prevail unless they contest a very narrow subset of activity.116
The APA, and more specifically its waiver of sovereign immunity,
serves as a means of regulating agency activity.117 Indeed, it was intended
to be a “bill of rights” for American citizens against the growing mass of
federal agency power.118 Gentile, however, displays how easily these assur112. Gentile, 974 F.3d at 318. The court noted that this requirement is at least
in part a result of concern over judicial overreach. See id. (noting that “an agency
decision to exercise its investigative power overcomes the ‘basic presumption’ in
favor of judicial review” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140
(1967))); see also Krent, supra note 26, at 1531 (discussing relationship between
sovereign immunity and separation of powers).
113. See Gentile 974 F.3d at 318–19 (noting that the hallmark of non-reviewability is the absence of “judicially manageable standards”). This approach may
provide federal agencies with an avenue to attack challenges to their activity.
Agencies can assert that any decision that is contested involved careful decisionmaking processes and required the balancing of different factors. Of course, a
court could always find that there is a “meaningful standard” of review,” but the
balancing analysis described by the Third Circuit provides a ground for the government to assert a discretion argument. Id. at 318–19; see also; COLE, supra note 1, at
12 (discussing the non-reviewability of decisions based on agency discretion, including those regarding whether to initiate an investigation).
114. See Gentile, 974 F.3d at 319–20. The court explained that even though
Gentile correctly challenged agency action, in the form of the FOI, the waiver’s
discretion exception still barred his claim. Id. Additionally, the court outlined the
various other requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to benefit from the
APA’s waiver. Id. at 316; see also COLE, supra note 1, at 2–7 (providing an overview
of the many requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy before securing judicial
review).
115. For a discussion of the precedent that led to the Third Circuit’s decision
in Gentile, see supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
116. Any claim brought must challenge statutorily defined agency action that
is not a product of agency discretion and is not otherwise barred. See Gentile, 974
F.3d at 319–20.
117. For a discussion of the APA, see supra notes 35–37 and accompanying
text.
118. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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ances may be swept away in the name of agency discretion.119 With a vast
amount of agency activity and decision-making protected by the shield of
sovereign immunity, it is unclear just how much the APA protects citizens
from agency overreach.
Ryan Brady and John Reid

119. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
balancing analysis which courts engage in when determining whether an agency
has acted using discretion and the potentially broad scope of activity that may fall
satisfy this balancing test.
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